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SUTTER BASIN CORPORATION, LTD. (a Corporation), 
Petitioner, v. HANLON BROWN, as County Treasurer, 
etc., et al., Respondents. 
[1] Reclamation-Bonds.-On the issuance of reclamation district 
bonds, a contract is created between the property owners and 
the bondholders. 
[2] Constitutional Law- Obligation of Contracts- Reclamation 
District Bonds.-The laws in existence at the time of issuance 
of reclamation district bonds enter into and become a part 
of the contract to such an extent that the obligation of the 
contract cannot thereafter be impaired or .fulfillment of the 
bond obligation hampered or obstructed by a change in such 
laws. 
[3] !d.-Obligation of Contracts-State and Municipal Contracts. 
-The Legislature's power regarding supervision, regulation 
and control of conduct of the affairs of irrigation, reclamation 
and drainage districts is plenary as to all governmental affairs, 
including procedure and administration, limited only where it 
tends to impair the obligation of a contract; such plenary 
power does not extend to and include the right of the Legisla-
ture to trench on private rights arising out of or based on 
contracts. 
[4] Reclamation- Bonds- Payment.- The time and method of 
payment of reclamation district bonds, as well as the nature 
of the security given the bondholders, are integral parts of 
the landowner-bondholder contract. 
[5] Id.-Bonds-Payment.-Where refunding bonds were issued 
by a reclamation district under the provisions of Pol. Code, 
§ 3480, as that section read in 1930, in accordance with which 
the landowners agreed to pay whatever was necessary to meet 
the principal and interest maturities after crediting thereon 
the funds in the county treasury applicable to such payment, 
retroactive effect may not be given to the 1949 amendment 
of such code section (now Wat. Code, § 51420) which re-
quires the county treasurer to exclude from the bond fund 
any monies obtained from sale and rental of lands, accelerates 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 158 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Constitutional Law, § 399 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6] Reclamation, § 86(1); [2, 3] Con-
stitutional Law, §135; [4,5,10] Reclamation, §86(4); [7,9] Rec-
lamation § 62; [8] Reclamation, § 60.5; [11, 12] Constitutional 
Law, § 138; [13] Reclamation, §SO; [14] Constitutional Law, §55. 
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the time of payment on the bonds and gives additional secur-
ity to the bondholders, since such changes, if applied to these 
bonds, are impairments of the contract of the landowners 
contrary to constitutional guarantees. 
[6] !d.-Bonds-Trust Funds.-Pol. Code,§ 3480, relating to bonds 
of reclamation districts, created a trust fund for the benefit 
of bondholders which consists of money received on install-
ment calls, from the sale of land on account of delinquencies 
or from the resale of land purchased by the county treasurer, 
and also all unsold land bought by him to satisfy delin-
quencies. 
[7] Id.-Assessments-Liens.-The nature of the burden which 
the levy of an assessment of a reclamation district places 
on a landowner must be measured by the terms of the statute 
creating the assessment, and where, at the time the assess-
ment was levied, it was expressly made a lien on the land 
against which it was levied (Pol. Code, § 3463; now W at. 
Code, § 51256), such assessment was to be paid in separate 
installments as the board of trustees in its discretion may 
direct (Pol. Code, § 3466; now Wat. Code, § 51517), and, 
when bonds were issued, the assessment became security for 
their payment (Pol. Code, §§ 3480, 3480a; now Wat. Code, 
§ 51257), the obligation of the landowner cannot thereafter 
be increased or lessened. 
[8] !d.-Assessments-Additional Assessments.-Provisions for 
additional assessments of a reclamation district, as found in 
Pol. Code, § 3480 (now Wat. Code, §§ 51300-51302) that the 
"lien of any unpaid assessment upon which bonds shall have 
been issued shall continue until all said bonds ... shall have 
been paid in full except as hereinafter provided in reference 
to the use of bonds as payment of assessments," and for 
supplemental assessments in the event any of the bonds re-
main unpaid after enforcement of the assessment, do not 
necessarily imply that the assessment will be extinguished 
as the bonds are retired, but make certain that it will con-
tinue until all outstanding bonds are paid. 
[9] Id.-Assessments-Lien-Discharge.-Code sections such as 
Pol. Code, § 3480a (now Wat. Code, § 51651), permitting 
discharge of lien of assessment of reclamation district when 
outstanding bonds are surrendered, indicate a legislative in-
tent to make the assessment coextensive only with the col-
lection of funds necessary to finance the improvement for 
which the assessment was levied. 
[10] Id.-Bonds-Payment.-The application of money available 
for payment of reclamation district bonds in the manner 
directed by Pol. Code, § 3480, as that section read in 1930 
when the bonds were issued, would not be a gift of public 
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funds to a private person in violation of Const., art. IV, 
~ 31, since such money is not the property of the state or 
of the district, but is part of a trust fund for benefit of the 
bondholders. 
[11] Constitutional Law-Equal Protection of Laws.-The equality 
guaranteed by the Constitution is an equality of right and 
not of enjoyment. 
[12] Id.-Equal Protection of Laws.-A law that confers equal 
rights on all citizens or subjects them to equal burdens is 
an equal law, and so long as the statute does not permit one 
to exercise the privilege while refusing it to another of like 
qualifications, it is unobjectionable. 
[13] Reclamation- Assessments- Proceedings to Enforce- De-
fenses.-In mandamus proceeding to compel county treasurer 
to cancel a call for payment of reclamation district bonds 
and to estimate funds available for payment of such bonds 
in the manner directed by Pol. Code, § 3480, as that section 
read in 1930 when the bonds were issued, it is no defense 
that the landowners electing to pay calls for assessments 
as they were made, rather than the landowners electing to 
discharge their liens by surrendering bonds purchased at a 
discount, benefited as a result of increase in land values fol-
lowing a depression, since "theirs was the greater risk, and 
theirs was the greater gain," and the writ need not therefore 
be denied to prevent an inequity. 
[14] Constitutional Law- Raising Constitutional Questions-
Waiver.-Right of landowner in reclamation district to raise 
constitutional question of impairment of contract posed by 
1949 amendment of Pol. Code, § 3480 (now Wat. Code, 
§ 51420), requiring county treasurer to exclude from bond 
fund any monies therein obtained from sale and rental of 
lands, is not waived, although landowner's counsel appeared 
before legislative committees and advocated adoption of such 
amendment, where he appeared in connection with proposed 
procedure in regard to sale of delinquent bonds and did not 
advocate exclusion from the treasurer's estimates of any 
money in the bond fund. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel county treasurer to 
cancel a call for a bond assessment on land in a reclamation 
district, and to direct him to estimate amount of instalment 
due on such assessment. Writ granted. 
[11] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 175; Am.Jur., Consti-
tutional Law, § 468 et seq. 
[14] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, §55; Am.Jur., Consti-
tutional Law, § 120. 
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Wright & Garrett, Alfred Wright and David M. Harney 
for Petitioner. 
Loyd E. Hewitt, District Attorney (Sutter), Bruce F. 
Allen, Stephen W. Downey and Downey, Brand, Seymour 
& Rohwer for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-The Treasurer of Sutter County has made 
a call upon the owners of lands in Reclamation District No. 
1500 for the payment of certain sums estimated in accordance 
with section 3480 of the Political Code, 1 as amended in 1949. 
His estimate includes the amounts of the installments of in-
terest and of principal due January 1, 1950, upon a series 
of refunding bonds issued in 1930. The amendment of 1949 
excludes from the estimate to be made by a county treasurer 
all amounts in a district's bond fund which were derived 
from the rentals or sales of lands sold to him to satisfy de-
linquencies in payment of calls. By writ of mandate, Sutter 
Basin Corporation, a landowner in the district, seeks to com-
pel the treasurer to cancel his present call, and to estimate 
the funds available for payment of the bonds in the manner 
directed by section 3480 as it read when the bonds were is-
sued. The question for decision is whether the 1949 legisla-
tion applies to bonds issued prior to its effective date. 
The facts have been presented by stipulation. 
Reclamation District No. 1500 lies wholly within Sutter 
County. In 1919, Assessment No. 1, apportioned among the 
landowners in accordance with ''special benefits'' (Pol. Code, 
§ 3456), 2 was levied by the district upon all the lands within 
its boundaries. One year later, bonds were issued in the 
approximate amount unpaid upon the assessment. In 1930, 
these bonds were in default and refunding bonds were issued 
as provided by section 3480a of the Political Code.3 The new 
obligations, maturing serially between 1941 and 1962, were 
in the principal amount of about $4,750,000. 
Except for the amendment of 1949, since 1930 there has 
been no change in the statutory provisions governing the 
payment of bonds of reclamation districts insofar as the rights 
1In 1951, the Legislature reenacted the provisions of the Political Code 
governing reclamation districts as division 15 of the Water Code. (Stats. 
1951, ch. 336, pp. 690-769.) The requirements of former section 3480 
of the Political Code, insofar as they apply to the present proceeding, 
are now found in sections 51420 to 51425 of the Water Code. 
"Now Wat. Code, §§ 51231, 51236. 
"Now Wat. Code, §§ 52500-52602. 
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of the parties in the present proceeding are concerned. Such 
bonds are payable from a bond fund, of which the treasurer 
of the "main county in which the district is located" is the 
trustee. To the extent that the bond fund is insufficient to 
pay installments due upon the bonds, the treasurer is directed 
to make a call upon each landowner in proportion to the 
amount of his unpaid assessment. (Pol. Code, § 3480.) 4 If 
a property owner becomes delinquent in the payment of a 
call, his land must be sold at public auction and the proceeds 
deposited in the bond fund. (Pol. Code, § 3480.) 5 An upset 
price is fixed equal to the sum of the delinquency, plus a 
penalty and interest. If, at public auction, no bid equal to 
that sum is received, the treasurer, as trustee of the bond 
fund, is required to bid the amount of the upset price and 
the land is sold to him. 
Prior to 1931, the treasurer could not resell such lands 
at less than the upset price. Due to the then existing de-
pression in economic conditions, the upset price generally was 
more than the value of the land. For that reason, large areas 
of land sold to the treasurer to satisfy delinquencies could not 
be disposed of by him. To permit their restoration to private 
ownership, section 3466a of the Political Code, 6 enacted in 
that year, authorized the sale of such lands at their fair 
market value, regardless of the statutory upset price. It 
also permitted the lands to be rented, the proceeds to be 
deposited in the bond fund. Despite the new provision, the 
lands to which the treasurer of Reclamation District No. 
1500 held title remained unsold, placing added burdens on 
the remaining landowners of the district. No taxes were 
paid on delinquent lands, and calls to satisfy installments due 
upon the bonds were not met. 
In 1949, section 3466a was amended to make mandatory 
the sale of such lands within prescribed time limits. (Stats. 
1949, ch. 719.) 7 The treasurer sold all of the lands in Reclam-
ation District No. 1500 upon which there were delinquent 
assessments and deposited the proceeds in the bond fund. 
Including the proceeds from such sales and from crop rentals, 
there is now $710,000 in that fund, and a resolution would 
be sufficient to transfer to it $160,000 which the district has 
'Wat. Code, §§ 51420-51425. 
"Wat. Code, §§ 51630-51651. 
"Wat. Code, §§ 51680-51695, 51750-51757. 
7 See Wat. Code, § 51680. 
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in its general fund. The outstanding bonds are in the prin-
cipal sum of $559,500. Interest computed to maturity amounts 
to $263,745. If and when the cash in the general fund is 
transferred, there would be in the bond fund more than 
enough money to pay principal and interest of the bonds in 
full. 
By the same statute, however, section 3480 of the Political 
Code8 was amended to read in part as follows : 
''At least ninety days before any interest day of the bonds, 
including refunding bonds, the county treasurer of the main 
county shall estimate the amount of money necessary to pay 
interest and principal maturing on such interest date after 
crediting thereon the funds in the treasury applicable to the 
payment thereof, excluding therefrom any funds in the 
treasury deposited therein purstwnt to Section 3466a of this 
code or derived from the sale of lancls by the county treasurer 
as trustee of the district under the provisions of this section 
or Sections 3466a and 3480a of this cocle and the expenses of 
the county treasurer hereinafter proviclecl and shall add thereto 
15 per cent of such aggregate to cover possible delinquencies. 
. . . " (Emphasis added to the amended portion.) 
The treasurer estimated that on January 1, 1950, $16,785 
would be due on account of interest and $8,000 on the prin-
cipal of the outstanding bonds. Acting under the 1949 
amendment, he issued a call for $24,895, plus the statutory 
amount to cover possible delinquencies, to owners of land 
subject to the 1919 assessment. Sutter Basin Corporation 
was notified that it must pay, as its share of the call, $13,757. 
The position of the petitioner in justification of the present 
proceeding is that a retroactive application of the 1949 amend-
ment, so as to exclude from the bond fund the proceeds from 
the resale of delinquent lands and crop rentals, will impair 
the obligation of the contract existing between the bond-
holders and the landowners of the district. So applied, it iR 
argued, the amendment will change the time and method of 
payment and give the bondholders additional security. 
The treasurer replies that the power of the Legislature 
over reclamation districts is plenary, and cannot be circum-
scribed. Furthermore, the amendment provides no benefit to 
the bondholders, and, without such benefit, there can be no 
impairment of contract. The funds derived from sales and 
rentals of delinquent lands result from section 3466a9 of the 
"Now Wat. Code, § 51420. 
"Now Wat. Code, §§ 51680-51695, 51750-51757. 
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Political Code, which was enacted subsequent to the refunding 
bond issue. Nor is there a detriment to the landowners, for 
the amendment merely enforces their duty to pay their assess-
ments, which has always existed. To hold otherwise would 
violate numerous provisions of the state and federal Con-
stitutions. 
Another contention of the treasurer is that issuance of a 
writ of mandate would be inequitable. Finally, he asserts, 
Sutter Basin Corporation has consented to and acquiesced in 
the amendment by advocating the adoption of the 1949 statute 
in appearances before both houses of the Legislature, and, 
therefore, it has waived its right to object to the amendment. 
[1] It cannot be questioned that, upon issuance of the 
bonds, a contract was created between the property owners and 
the bondholders. (Islais Co. v. Matheson, 3 Cal.2d 657, 662 
[45 P.2d 326]; County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal.2d 
192, 200 [44 P.2d 340, 100 A.J_~.R. 149]; County of San Diego 
v. Childs, 217 Cal. 109, 120 [17 P.2d 734]; Copeland v. Raub, 
36 Cal.App.2d 441, 447 [97 P.2d 859]; River Farms Co. v. 
Gibson, 4 Cal.App.2d 731, 749 [42 P.2d 95] ; Hershey v. Cole, 
130 Cal.App. 683, 695 [20 P.2d 972] .) [2] The laws in 
existence at that time, under the authority of which the bonds 
were issued, ''. . . enter into and become a part of the con-
tract to such extent that the obligation of the contract cannot 
thereafter be impaired or fulfillment of the bond obligation 
lwmpered or obstructed by a change in such laws." (County 
of San Bernardino v. Wa.y, 18 Cal.2d 647,661 [117 P.2d 354].) 
[3] The treasurer's contention that legislation in regard 
to reclamation districts is within the plenary power of the 
state, and cannot be challenged by a landowner of the district, 
is answered in He1·shey v. Cole, 130 Cal.App. 683 [20 P.2d 
072 J. The court said : ''The supervision, the regulation and 
the controlling of the conduct of the affairs of irrigation, 
reel amation and drainage districts is plenary as to all govern-
mental affairs, including procedure and administration, 
limited only where it tends to impair the obligation of a 
contract. In other words, the plenary power does not extend to 
and include the right of the legislature to trench upon private 
rights arising out of or based upon contracts." (P. 687.) 
[ 4] rrhe time and method of payment, as well as the nature 
of the security given the bondholders, are integral parts of 
the landowner-bondholder contract. (Shouse v. Quinley, 3 
Cal.2d 357, 361 [ 45 P.2d 701] ; County of Los Angeles v. Rock-
hold, 3 Cal.2d 192, 210 [ 44 P.2d 340, 100 A.L.R. 149] ; Security 
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Trust & Sav. Bank v. City of Los Angeles, 120 Cal.App. 518, 524 
[7 P.2d 1061] .) Sutter Basin Corporation contends that the 
1949 amendment impairs each of these aspects of its contract. 
As section 3480 of the Political Code read in 1930, when 
the refunding bonds were issued, the bond fund was to consist 
of all amounts collected by the treasurer upon assessment calls, 
and also from either the sale of delinquent ~ands or their 
redemption, as well as the proceeds of the resale of lands 
purchased by him at sales to satisfy delinquent calls. Such 
funds were to be used exclusively for the payment of principal 
and interest on outstanding bonds. Each year the treasurer 
was required to estimate the amount of money necessary to 
pay maturing interest and principal, ''crediting thereon the 
funds in the treasury applicable to the payment thereof" and 
thereafter to issue a call to the owners of lands subject to 
the assessment for the balance, adding thereto 15 per cent to 
cover possible delinquencies. The obligation of each land-
owner was to pay the portion of the balance represented 
by his unpaid assessment, plus an additional amount to cover 
possible delinquencies. 
[5] According to the 1949 amendment, the treasurer must 
exclude from his estimate a portion of the moneys in the bond 
fund formerly available for bond payments. Necessarily, if 
the statute is to be applied as construed by him, an additional 
burden of payment is placed upon the landowners. Moreover, 
the time at which the landowner must make payment is ac-
celerated. If the amounts sought to be excluded by the 1949 
amendment may be used to pay the current installment due 
upon the bonds, there is no necessity for landowners to pay 
the present call. The amendment also changes the order of 
payment. By its terms, the treasurer must collect calls from 
landowners before certain money in the bond fund may be 
used. Formerly, he was to call upon all such funds first. 
These changes, if applied to bonds issued prior to the effective 
date of the amendment, are impairments of the contract of the 
landowners contrary to constitutional guarantees. ( Cf. Shouse 
v. Quinley, 3 Cal.2d 357, 360-361 [45 P.2d 701]; Mulcahy v. 
Baldwin, 216 Cal. 517, 525 [15 P.2d 738]; Copeland v. Raub, 
36 Cal.App.2d 441, 447 [97 P.2d 859]; Hershey v. Cole, 130 
Cal.App. 683, 701 [20 P.2d 972] .) 
The retroactive application of the 1949 amendment would 
impair the obligations of the landowner-bondowner con-
tract in still another manner. By sections 3480 and 3480a of 
the Political Code, the lien of the assessment is made security 
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for the payment of the bonds. 10 Through the trustee of the 
bond fund, the bondholders may enforce their right to pay-
ment by a sale of land upon which a call has become de-
linquent. Prior to the amendment, the proceeds from such 
sales, or from the resale or rentals of delinquent lands, were 
required to be immediately applied to bond payments. Section 
0480 of the Political Code 11 provides that they may be used 
for no other purpose. By directing the county treasurer to 
exclude such funds from his estimate, the amendment forces 
him to keep them intact. 'l'he bondholders are thus given a 
fund which must be held in reserve for their benefit in addition 
to the security of the assessment, thereby increasing their 
security. 
'l'he treasurer, however, argues that the landowners have 
no rights in the exeluded funds, because the money was not 
paid to him pursuant to the statutory provisions which were 
a part of the 1930 contract. He correctly points out that 
the 1949 amendment excludes from credit in the computation 
of calls any amount in the treasury ''deposited therein pursu-
ant to Seetion 3466a of this code or derived from the sale of 
lands by the county treasurer as trustee of the district under 
the provisions of this section or Sections 3466a and 3480a of 
this code .... " Specifically, says the treasurer, the only 
money excluded by the challenged computation is either the 
purchase price of delinquent land or crop rental derived by 
virtue of section 3466a, which was not enacted until 1931, a 
year after the bonds were issued.12 
[6] This argument was conclusively answered by the de-
cision in River Farms Co. v. Gibson, 4 Cal..App.2d 731 [ 42 
P.2d 95]. In speaking of section 3466a, it was there said: 
''That the lands purchased by the county treasurer and deeded 
to himself as trustee either of the bond fund or for the benefit 
of tlle district, constitute a trust for the benefit of the bond-
holders, seems to us explicitly stated in the terms used in 
section 3480, s~tpra, as it originally read and as it now stands 
amended. All moneys collected by the treasurer, whether on 
account of installment, penalties, interest or sale of lands, 
must be by him paid into the treasury for the benefit of the 
bondholders." (P. 744.) In essence, the court held that sec-
10See Wat. Code, § 51257. 
11Cf. Wat. Code, §§ 51238, 51643. 
12Stats. 1931, ch. 317, p. 773; now Wat. Code, §§ 51680-51695, 51750-
51757. 
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tion 3480 ereated a trust fund for the benefit of bondholders 
which eonsists of money rPeeived on installment calls, from 
the sale of land on account of delinqucneies, or from the resale 
of land purehased by the treasurer, and also all unsold land 
bought by him to satisfy delinquencies. 
Concerning the money derived from the lease or operation 
of unsold lands of the distriet, it was said: '' 'rhat the rents, 
issues and profits derived from trust properties follow the 
cor-p1[S and beeome a part of the trust funds is unquestioned, 
irrespeetive of the act of the legislature adding section 
3466 (a), supra, providing for the management of property, the 
title to which has beeome vested in the county treasurer for 
the benefit of the distriet, and the specifying therein of the 
applieation to be made of rents, issues and profits." (P. 755.) 
The treasurer argues that there is no increased burden upon 
the landowner, because the amendment merely provides a 
method of discharging the obligation of the assessment. His 
position is that the assessment is a fixed liability. 
[7] The nature of the burden whieh the levy of an assess-
ment plaees upon the landowner must be measured by the 
terms of the statute ereating the assessment. (Ryan v. Byram, 
4 Cal.2d 596, 606 [51 P.2d 872]; Flinn v. Zerbe, 40 Cal.App. 
294, 296 [180 P. 650] ; Abrams v. San Francisco, 48 Cal.App. 
2d 1, 6 [119 P.2d 197] .) In 1919, when Assessment No. 1 was 
levied, it was expressly made a lien upon the land against 
which it was levied. (Pol. Code, § 3463.) 13 Such assessment 
was to be paid ''in separate installments, of such amounts, 
and at such times, respeetively, as the [board of trustees], 
from time to time, in its diseretion by order entered in its 
minutes may direet." (Pol. Code, § 3466.) 14 \Vhen bonds 
were issued, the assessment beeame seeurity for their pay-
ment. (Pol. Code, §§ 3480, 3480a.) 15 Thereafter, the obligation 
of the property owner was measured by the statutory pro-
visions applicable to payment. "His obligations eannot be in-
ereased or lessened. The portion of the assessment, or rather, 
the amount of the installment that is to be paid by the land 
owner at each annual period is fixed when the contract is 
eompleted, by the sale of the bonds." (Hershey v. Cole, 130 
Cal.App. 683, 689-700 [20 P.2d 972] .) 
The treasurer contends that if the "credit provisions" of 
section 3480, as it read when the bonds were issued, are 
18Now Wat. Code, § 51256. 
14Now Wat. Code, § 51517. 
15Now Wat. Code, § 51257. 
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"held to require the purchase price and rentals of the de-
linquent lands in the bond fund to be credited against the 
bond calls as contended for by petitioner then, under the 
facts of this case, and the law as so construed and applied 
there would be clear violation of numerous provisions of both 
the federal and state constitutions.'' This argument is based 
upon the assumption that if all of the moneyin the bond fund 
is used to discharge the outstanding bonds, Sutter Basin Cor-
poration and other landowners may never have to pay the 
assessment outstanding against their lands. 
Bearing upon this issue is the paragraph entitled "Addi-
tional assessment,'' found in section 3480 of the Political 
Code. 16 It reads : "The lien of any unpaid assessment upon 
which bonds shall have been issued shall continue until all 
said bonds, and any refunding bonds which may be issued, 
shall have been paid in full except as hereinafter provided 
in reference to the use of bonds as payment of assessments 
. . . '' The section also authorizes supplemental assessments 
in the event any of the bonds remain unpaid after the en-
forcement of the assessment. 
[8] These provisions do not necessarily imply that the 
assessment will be extinguished as the bonds are retired but 
make certain that it will continue until all outstanding bonds 
are paid. However, section 345617 requires all money derived 
from calls on the assessment to be set ''apart as a separate 
fund for the purpose of paying the principal and interest 
of such bonds,'' and that no part of such money shall be 
used for any other purpose. There is no provision for mak-
ing a call upon the assessment after all bonds have been 
retired; the only statutory authority for a call is to "pay in-
terest and principal maturing on such interest date." (Pol. 
Code, § 3480.) 18 In Bekins v. Raub, 40 Cal.App.2d 709 [105 
P.2d 625], it was held that, after bonds are issued, there 
is no right to call the assessment except to meet unpaid in-
stallments of principal and interest. Under no statute is 
the assessment lien extinguished by discharge of the out-
standing bonds, neither is there any provision by which a land-
owner may be compelled to pay the assessment. However, 
section 3480 of the Political Code19 reads: "Any landowner 
16Now Wat. Code, §§ 51300-51302. 
17Now Wat. Code, § 51238. 
18Now Wat. Code, § 51420, supra. 
19Wat. Code, § 51651. 
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of the district who shall desire at any time to lessen or re-
move the lien upon his land of any assessment on which 
bonds have been or hereafter may be issued may deliver to 
the county treasurer for cancellation any bonds payable out 
of said assessment, and the treasurer shall credit against the 
assessment on his land the principal and accrued interest.'' 
The purpose of the 1919 assessment was to provide for 
the cost of a specific improvement. The integral relation-
ship between the assessment, the bonds issued to pay for that 
improvement, and the improvement itself was clearly recog-
nized in Rohwer v. Gibson, 126 Cal.App. 707 [14 P.2d 1051]. 
In that ease, the court denied a petition for a writ of man-
date to compel the levy of an additional assessment for the 
purpose of paying delinquent installments upon outstanding 
bonds. It was held that the statutory provisions specifying 
the procedure for payment of the bonds were a limitation 
upon the taxing power of the district. ''When the collection 
of taxes has reached the value of the benefits conferred upon 
the lands within the district, there is then no legal provision 
for placing additional burdens. In other words, if under 
such conditions the bonded indebtedness has not all been 
paid, there exists no legal provision by means of which the 
holders thereof may receive payment." (Pp. 713-714.) 
[9] In the present situation, the taxing power will have 
been fully exercised when the improvement, to finance which 
the bonds were issued, has been paid for by the exaction of 
taxes in the form of calls for bond payments. This eon-
elusion is strengthened by the language of those sections per-
mitting the discharge of the lien of the assessment when out-
standing bonds are surrendered. These sections clearly in-
dicate a legislative intent to make the assessment eo-extensive 
only with the collection of funds necessary to finance the 
improvement for which the assessment was levied. Presum-
ably, the bond issue of Reclamation District No. 1500 was 
sufficient in amount to pay for the contemplated improve-
ments for which the 1919 assessment was levied. Upon pay-
ment of the bonds, the assessment will have been fully dis-
charged. 
[10] The contention of the treasurer that the application 
to bond payments of the money in controversy would be a gift 
of public funds to a private person, in violation of section 
31 of article IV of the Constitution, is entirely without merit. 
Such money is not the property of the state or the district, 
but is a part of a trust fund held for the benefit of the bond-
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holders. (River Farms Co. v. Gibson, supra.) Furthermore, 
payment of the legal obligation of the landowners to the 
bondholders is not a gift. 
The county treasurer urges, however, that to permit a 
discharge of the unpaid assessments will discriminate against 
the landowners who have paid their assessments in full. Such 
result, it is argued, would cause them to bear the greater 
part of the cost of the improvement and deny to them equal 
protection of the laws, due process of law, grant to some 
landowners special privileges and immunities, and constitute 
special legislation. 
Under the applicable statutes, a landowner was given two 
methods of discharging the lien of the assessment. He could 
acquire outstanding bonds of a face value equal to the amount 
of the assessment and, upon delivering them to the treasurer, 
have the lien discharged. If he preferred to do so, he could 
pay such calls as might be levied from time to time against 
his property. Such were the terms of the contract which 
the landowner accepted when the bonds were issued. Each 
property owner had the choice of taking the course which 
he deemed the more advisable. [11] ''The equality of the 
Constitution is the equality of right, and not of enjoyment. 
[12] A law that confers equal rights on all citizens of the state, 
or subjects them to equal burdens, is an equal law. [Cita-
tions.] So long as the statute does not permit one to exercise 
the privilege while refusing it to another of like qualifica-
tions, under like conditions and circumstances, it is unob-
jectionable upon this ground." (Watson v. Division of Motor 
Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 284 [298 P. 481].) 
[13] Even if there be no legal basis prohibiting the ap-
plication of the excluded funds to payment of the bonds, 
argues the county treasurer, a writ of mandate must be denied 
to prevent an inequity. 
That there is presently sufficient money to pay the out-
standing bonds, without resort to calls on the assessment, 
is a fact which results from the economic conditions of the 
times. In the years immediately following the issuance of 
the refunding bonds there was economic depression. During 
that time, many landowners were unable to pay the calls of 
the treasurer and their lands were sold for delinquencies. 
Finding no bidders willing to pay the statutory upset price, 
the treasurer was obligated to buy the lands for the bond 
fund. By 1949, when the lands were sold, they had greatly 
increased in value. The amount here in controversy repre-
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sents almost exclusively that increase in value. More ac-
curately, that amount is an increment of the trust corpus 
from which the landowners' obligation to the bondholders 
was to be discharged. That all the landowners are not en-
titled to share in this fortuitous increase results from the 
course each selected to discharge the lien of his assessment. 
The depression conditions which influenced the prices of 
land and the ability of property owners to pay calls also 
were reflected in the value of outstanding bonds. It has been 
stipulated that many property owners were able to buy bonds 
at a substantial discount and apply them at face value against 
the lien of their assessments. Because the bonds of latest 
maturity could be purchased at the greatest discount, in the 
main, those surrendered were of that class. As a result there 
were fewer obligated landowners, thereby increasing the 
proportionate amount necessary to be paid by the remainder 
of them to meet the treasurer's calls to satisfy the currently 
maturing bonds. The treasurer's purchases of delinquent 
lands also increased the proportionate shares of the amounts 
necessary to meet bond payments. In addition, they were 
subjected to a 15 per cent charge over and above their shares 
to cover possible delinquencies. (Pol. Code, § 3480.) 20 
The course of action taken by each landowner was chosen 
with these facts clearly apparent. Those electing to dis-
charge their liens by surrendering bonds purchased at a 
discount thought they were in a better position than the ones 
who decided to pay the calls as they were made. The land-
owners taking the second alternative relied upon the chance 
that the bond fund would be sufficient to meet all accruing 
amounts of principal and interest. That they have benefited 
by the exercise of business judgment which the law permitted 
is of no legal consequence in this proceeding. Theirs was 
the greater risk, and theirs was the greater gain. 
[14] The record does not support the treasurer's conten-
tion that Sutter Basin Corporation has waived the right to 
raise the constitutional question because its counsel appeared 
before committees of both houses of the Legislature and ad-
vocated the adoption of the amendment to section 3480 here 
in issue. The stipulation of facts shows that at no time did 
he advocate the exclusion from the treasurer's estimates of 
any money in the bond fund. He appeared in connection 
with proposed procedure in regard to the sale of delinquent 
lands. 
""Now Wat. Code, § 51420. 
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These considerations compel the conclusion that a retro-
active application of the 1949 amendment would impair the 
contract existing between the landowners and the bondholders. 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Gibson, C. J., dissented. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur. 
It is my opinion that the judgment herein follows necessarily 
from the premise established by the many California cases 
cited in the majority opinion that upon the issuance of bonds 
by a reclamation district a contract is created between the 
landowners of the district and the bondholders. Although 
persuasive arguments can be made against the soundness of 
this premise (see cases cited in 100 A.L.R. 164), it has become 
a rule of property governing the rights and duties of land-
owners and bondholders under past bond issues. It does not 
follow that the reasoning underlying the cases establishing 
the rule must be applied to future bond issues. (See con-
curring opinion in Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal.2d 613, 623 [145 P.2d 
312].) This court could provide a sound rule for the future 
by declaring that although those cases govern past bond issues, 
they are to be deemed overruled as applied to future bond 
issues. (Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst oa & Refining 
Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 [53 S.Ct. 145, 77 Ij.Ed. 360, 85 A.L.R. 
254] ; People v. Ryan, 152 CaL 364, 369 [92 P. 853] ; People v. 
Maughs, 149 Cal. 253, 263 [86 P. 187] .) A majority of this 
court, however, appears unwilling to reexamine the earlier 
cases at this time. 
It bears noting that even though these cases are not over-
ruled, the Legislature is free to provide that in future bond 
issues the relationship between landowner and district is that 
of sovereign and taxpayer and does not give the landowner 
contractual rights. The relationship between district and 
bondholder should of course remain contractual and the bond-
holder's rights free from impairment. 
CARTER, ,J.-I dissent. 
The premise on which the majority opmwn is based is, 
that where bonds have been issued by a reclamation district 
which arc secured by a special assessment levied upon the lands 
in the district according to the benefits received, there is a 
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contract between the bondholders and the landowners arising 
out of the law existing at the time the bonds are issued which 
cannot be changed, insofar as the landowner is concerned, by 
subsequent legislation; that such a change occurred here by 
reason of the amendment to Political Code, section 3480 (now 
Wat. Code, § 51420) enacted in 1949, which required the 
treasurer to exclude from the bond fund any monies therein 
which were obtained from the sale and rental of lands, ac-
quired by the district as the result of sales for delinquent 
assessments, when he made his estimate of the amount of 
the annual installment required to meet the unpaid assess-
ment. It is held that such exclusion impaired the contract 
between the bondholders and landowners in that it changes the 
time and method of payment of the assessment and gives the 
bondholders additional security because the landowner was 
entitled to have the land sale and rental money used to pay 
the bonds before he could be required to pay any installment 
of the assessment. 
It is conceded, as it necessarily must be, that the Legislature 
has plenary power with regard to reclamation districts and 
that the Legislature may change the law with respect to them 
at will. " ... [T]he Legislature shall have power to provide 
for the supervision, regulation and conduct, in such manner 
as it may determine, of the affairs of irrigation districts, 
reclamation districts or drainage districts, organized or exist-
ing under any law of this State." (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 13.) 
It necessarily follows that, as far as the landowners are con-
cerned, there is no contract beil'ween the district and the land-
owners arising out of the statutes which existed when the 
bonds were issued, because, if it were otherwise the Legislature 
would not have the plenary power it does have over the affairs 
of reclamation districts. The majority opinion states, how-
ever, that there is such a contract between the landowners and 
the bondholders which cannot be impaired by a change in the 
law, which is merely an indirect way of saying there is a 
contract between the landowner and the district. Such a hold-
ing is contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority (100 
A.L.R. 164), and the cases to the contrary in this state holding 
that there is such a contract between the bondholders and 
landowners should be overruled. In some of those cases it 
has been so stated when the issue was whether the bondholders' 
contract with the district had been impaired- whether their 
rights could be lessened by subsequent legislation, not whether 
the landowners' "rights" could be changed. (Islais Co. v. 
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Matheson, 3 Cal.2d 657 l45 P.2d 326]; Copeland v. Raub, 
86 Cal.App.2d 441 l97 P.2d 859]; River Farms Co. v. Gibson, 
4 Cal.App.2d 731 [42 P.2d 95].) The other cases (County of 
Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal.2d 192 [44 P.2d 340, 100 .A.L.R. 
149]; County of San Diego v. Childs, 217 Cal. 109 [17 P.2d 
734]; Hershey v. Cole, 130 Cal.App. 683 [20 P.2d 972]) that 
do hold that the landowner also has a contract right with the 
bondholder to the continuance of the existing law are clearly 
wrong. In the instant case the bondholders are not asserting 
that the money received from the rental and sale of delinquent 
lands must be considered in computing the annual assessment 
installment. The landowner is asserting that claim against 
the district and the legislative amendment to section 3680. He 
may not do so because of the plenary power of the Legislature 
over the taxes or assessments that the landowner may be re-
quired to pay. 
While it is true that before the 1949 amendment to section 
3680, the treasurer, in computing the annual assessment in-
stallment considered moneys already in the bond fund from 
any proper source as being available to pay the installment. 
'l'hat may be said to have been merely a method of arriving 
at the amount of the installment in which the landowner has 
no contract right because the basic assessment was made 
against his land in a lump sum and that is his fundamental 
liability. 
Assuming there is a contract between the bondholders and 
landowners which the latter may insist cannot be impaired 
as against the district by any subsequent legislation, there 
has been no impairment here, and even if there has been to 
some extent, it may be justified under the police power. 
The majority opinion states that the contract under section 
3480 of the Political Code is that the bond fund was to 
consist of all assessments and amounts collected from the 
sale of delinquent lands, and such fund was to be used exclu-
sively for the payment of bonds; that the treasurer shall an-
nually estimate the amount of the installment on the assess-
ment to be paid, and in making his computation, shall give 
consideration to the amount then in that fund from any proper 
source. It is the latter provision which was changed by the 
1949 amendment to that section which provided that the 
amount in the fund from the sale of lands should be excluded 
in computing the annual assessment call. Such a change does 
not constitute an impairment of the contract. The basic con-
tract on the part of the landowner was an agreement to pay 
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the entire assessment which was levied against his land, and 
it has always been payable in installments of such amounts 
and at such times as the board of directors of the district may 
direct. (Pol. Code, § 3466; Wat. Code, § 51517.) The com-
putation provision was merely a method of arriving at the 
amount of an annual installment and did not purport to lessen 
the amount of the assessment payable. It did not give the land-
owners an absolute right to have the assessment installments 
computed in that way. It may have given them the right to 
insist that the money in the fund be used to pay bonds, but 
the time or method of the payment of the assessment was left 
to the discretion of the board of directors of the district and 
the Legislature. Indeed it may be that the method of com-
putation of the installments was for the sole benefit of the 
bondholders rather than the landowners. It fixes a procedure 
which will assure the former of f~nds to pay their bonds and 
interest coupons as they fall due rather than a limitation 
on the amount of the installment that may be demanded. 
It is also suggested that the bondholders are given greater 
security by the 1949 amendment than they had before, that 
is, an assessment call large enough in itself to pay principle 
and interest without crediting the amount already in the bond 
fund. The bondholders at all times had that security, be-
cause, by the terms of the bonds as set forth in the form of 
bond contained in section 3480, the bonds were "based upon 
and secured by the assessment levied on the lands.'' 
The Legislature could have reasonably concluded that if 
there is some impairment of the contract it was justified under 
its police power. It could reasonably determine that there 
should be equity and fairness as between the landowners in 
the district and that it would be inequitable for the land-
owner here involved to obtain a windfall by reason of the 
money in the bond fund which was obtained from the sale 
of delinquent lands-that is, by excluding such money, he 
will not be excused from paying his assessment when the others 
have paid theirs. The Legislature may have reasonably de-
cided that the most equitable method to meet the condition 
brought about by changing economic conditions was to require 
the assessments to be paid in full, leaving the district with 
surplus funds which will ultimately inure to the benefit of all 
landowners in the district, rather than giving one landowner 
a windfall. It is not a case of taking delinquent land sales 
money from the landowners to their detriment. Those funds 
still are held for the benefit of all of them. It is true that 
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other owners have paid their assessments with bonds at their 
face value, which they purchased at a price below that amount 
during the depression, and hence benefited, but whether that 
matches the windfall the instant landowner will receive or 
whether it is better for the district to have the funds for the 
benefit of all under the 1949 amendment, was properly a 
matter of legislative determination. It should be noted that 
the Legislature could also consider that any assessment in-
stallment now paid is with inflated money, but the amount 
of the bond has not increased since the depression because 
the amount payable on the bonds is fixed. 
The essence of the majority opinion's position seems to be 
that the landowners are entitled to have the bond fund ex-
hausted and that source alone must first be used to pay the 
bonds and hence the regular annual assessment cannot be col-
lected. That is substantially the same as County of San Diego 
v. Hamrnond, 6 Cal.2d 709 [59 P.2d 478, 105 A..L.R. 1155], 
where legislation was passed after an assessment and bond 
issue which was payable solely out of assessments against the 
lands benefited, which authorized the county to pay the assess-
ments out of a general tax levy. Some of the landowners, 
who had paid all their assessments, urged that it would impair 
their contract, under which the assessment was all they would 
have to pay; that by their being subject to the general tax to 
reduce assessments on landowners who had not paid their 
assessments, their contract that the bonds would be paid only 
by the assessments, was impaired. The court held it was not. 
To the same effect see City of Dunsmuir v. Porter, 7 Cal.2d 
269 [60 P.2d 836]. Likewise, in the instant case, petitioner's 
contract has not been impaired because it was always liable 
for the assessment and cannot insist that the bonds be payable 
solely from funds derived from the sale and rental of de-
linquent lands. Petitioner is not being injured because, to 
give it what it claims, would be a windfall, not something to 
which it is entitled. 
It is my view that the petition should be denied. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied March 
16, 1953. Gibson, C. ,T., and Carter, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
